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TRULY NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES:  A UNFIED THEORY
Fig. 1. – A Conversation with Willard Boyle (1)$
MATT FUNK, FLS£
18 May 2010
A DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of The University of Malta,
in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
$ [A] Canadian... won a Nobel Prize Tuesday. But physicist Willard Boyle had to move to the U.S. to do his cutting-edge work.  
     Dr Boyle... warned that managers need to give scientists leeway to come up with the kinds of transformative inventions that are too often 
stifled by paperwork and red tape.  
     What scientists face today is 'almost disgraceful.  Do you think... George Smith and I ever wrote a business plan [or “ethics review board” 
requests, or wasted time slaving over academic journal formalisms]?...  You don't have time to do that kind of baloney.'
     Early in his career, Dr Boyle got a job at Bell Laboratories, a private research lab in New Jersey where he was given free rein to pursue his  
interests.  He and Dr Smith, who is American, came up with their invention while sketching possibilities on a blackboard in October, 1969.
     'There was something about that institution,' Dr Boyle told The Chronicle-Herald in Halifax...
     'I guess it was the management and the style and the general environment of the place....'
     Dr Boyle... said policy-makers should look at the practices of think tanks that produce Nobel Prize-winners..., instead of 'pouring money 
randomly into [things], expecting the same results.'
     'Usually... management people or... politicians haven't got the foggiest idea of what science is all about.'  What is needed is 'an appreciation for  
the free will, free spirit of scientists.  Give them a chance to do the things they want to do' (2 ; cf  3 ; §3).
£ The writer's object in putting forward his views in the present imperfect manner is to submit them to the test of other minds, and to be made 
aware of all the facts supposed to be inconsistent with them.  As his hypothesis is one which claims acceptance solely as explaining and connecting 
facts which exist in nature, he expects facts alone to be brought to disprove it; not à-priori arguments against its probability (4).
ABSTRACT
This dissertation introduces Truly Non-cooperative Games – 
axioms and complimentary negotiation models developed to 
analyse the human Struggle for Life (cf 5-11) – and presents 
The Principle of Relative Insularity, a unified theory of value 
which unites economics, astrophysics, and biology.  In brief, 
we discover that, reductio ad absurdum, value is a derivative 
function of relative insularity:  V=f´(IR).
$
§1.  PROBLEM SITUATION£
It appears Aristotle may have been amongst the first to search 
for a theory of value (14), and this quest has kept true 
problem-solvers awake at night ever since: 
In economics the most fundamental of these central 
problems is the theory of value.  The theory of value 
must explain how the comparative values of different 
goods  and  services  are  established.   Until  that 
problem is  solved, it  is  not  possible  to  analyse for 
scientific  purposes  what  will  be  produced  and  in 
what quantities, how the resources will be employed 
in  producing  the  menu  of  outputs,  and  how  the 
resources will be valued (15).
And thus it remains impossible to analyse a myriad of related 
problems, including sustainable economic development, 
global warming, warfighting, asteroids, supervolcanoes, 
reserve currencies, and value at risk (VaR).  Indeed, 
“insufficient consideration of [these] circumstances lie at the 
root of  [our present] difficulties” (16).
$ Value is the essence of things in economics.  Its laws are to political 
economy what the law of gravity is to mechanics.  Every great system 
of political economy up till now has formulated its own peculiar view 
on value as the ultimate foundation in theory of its applications to 
practical life, and no new effort at reform can have laid an adequate 
foundation for these applications if it cannot support them on a new 
and more perfect theory of value (12).
£ When we propose a theory... we also propose, or try to understand, 
its logical implications; that is, all those statements which follow from 
it.  But this… is a hopeless task: there is an infinity of unforeseeable 
nontrivial  statements  belonging  to  the  informative  content  of  any 
theory, and an exactly corresponding infinity of statements belonging 
to its logical content.  We can therefore never know or understand all 
the implications of any theory, or its full significance.
     ...Understanding a theory is always an infinite task, and... theories 
can in principle be understood better and better.  ...If  we wish to 
understand a theory better, what we have to do first is to discover its 
logical relation to those existing problems and existing theories which 
constitute what we may call the 'problem situation'.
     Admittedly, we also try to look ahead:  we try to discover new 
problems raised by our theory.  But the task is infinite, and can never 
be completed (13).
§2.  HYPOTHESIS
Nash developed fruitful equilibrium points (17 ; cf 18) and 
non-cooperative games (19), emphasizing the existence of
situations  in  economics  or  international  politics  in 
which, effectively, a group of interests are involved in 
a non-cooperative game without being aware of it; 
the non-awareness [making] the situation truly non-
cooperative (19).
Our theory (20-24), in contradistinction, highlights the truly 
non-cooperative nature of every situation in the universe.  Thus 
our realistic, asymmetric games (25) share attributes with 
games against nature (26) and games with incomplete 
information (27).
But  as  the  exposition  of  the  entire  group  of 
considerations  would  be  rather  difficult  to  follow, 
only  a  few  quite  elementary  reflexions  will  be 
given..., from which the reader will readily be able 
to inform himself [i.e., 20-24] as to the suppositions 
of the theory and its line of thought (28).
Two players, Relatively Insular States (RIS) and Globalized  
Economic Military Superpowers (GEMS) fight for survival (cf 5-
11); axioms (20-21) inform strategy:  RIS = Maximum 
Ecological Protection, GEMS = Maximum Economic Development. 
Equilibrium is attained when players pursue rational, 
opposing Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) (22) by 
employing The Principle of Relative Insularity.  Strategic 
equilibrium yields rational, mutually beneficial behaviour, 
maximum planetary insularity, and thus maximizes value 
(22).  Furthermore, strategic transparency facilitates rational 
play:  If all players recognize the value of respective, opposing 
– yet inherently complimentary and, perhaps ironically, ultimately  
cooperative – strategies, then all players act, communicate, 
negotiate, and cooperate more rationally, peacefully, and thus 
economic development is optimized and human survival 
prospects are maximized (22).
     Alas, “nothing seems less wanted than a simple solution to 
an age-old... problem” (30); thus we shall emphasize and 
contextualize:  Ulam once challenged Samuelson to name a 
social theory which was nontrivial and true; Samuelson 
countered with Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage:
That it is logically true need not be argued before a 
mathematician; that  is  not trivial  is  attested by the 
thousands of  ... men who have never been able to 
grasp  the  doctrine  for  themselves  or  to  believe  it 
after it was explained to them (31).
As a sailor who has encountered countless intelligent 
islanders unable to grasp this doctrine (22), I'm inclined to 
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agree, but a stronger rebuttal to Ulam's challenge, On the  
Origin of Mass Extinctions: Darwin's Nontrivial Error (24), 
requires our immediate attention.
     Furthermore, the “denaturalization of economics” (32), 
logic of war (33), true nature economic power (34), Hardin's 
error (35-36), and Popper's solution to Hume's problem of 
induction (37-38) require patient and careful consideration as 
well.  Indeed, these nontrivial truths (32-38) may help us 
grasp why our in-communicative (39) and thus truly 
uncooperative “prisoners” (40) – the unknown and unknowable  
future (21) – beg us to reconsider fashionable (but false) 
theories, plead for international cooperation (24), and 
implore us to consider a revolutionary approach to science.$
     Which brings us to our final reflexion:
In  1452  in  Mainz,  Germany,  a  goldsmith  named 
Johannes Gutenberg put ink to movable type and.... 
Gutenberg’s invention was a piece of technology that 
made printing... simple and inexpensive.  His  first 
[book] was a bible.  Venture capitalists, if there were 
such  a  thing  in  fifteenth-century  Germany,  might 
have looked at Gutenberg’s... invention and seen a 
way to make cheaper bibles.  'Let’s pour some money 
into Gutenberg’s printing press and in a few years we 
can take over the whole Bible business,' they might... 
have concluded.  If they had done so, however, they 
would have missed the entire point...  The printing 
press  was  not  about  cheaper  bibles,  it  was  a 
technological  revolution  that  made  it  possible  for 
anyone with an idea to publish anything.  [It] changed 
our world.  It led to an explosion of knowledge, of 
learning,  of  ideas.   It  brought  down  Medieval 
Europe..., crushed the Power of Kings, and gave rise 
to the middle class, manufacturing, and trade.  It set 
off  the Enlightenment and created... the world we 
inhabit  today.   We  are,  in  effect,  the  direct 
descendents of the Gutenberg Revolution.  The US 
Constitution  is  a  written,  printed  document.   It 
enumerates  our  rights  and  how  our  country  is 
supposed to work.  Yet the very first Amendment..., 
the very core of the Bill of Rights does not say 'You 
have the right to vote' or 'You have the right to be 
free.'  Instead, it says, 'Congress Shall Make No Law 
Abridging  a  Free  Press.'   That  is  because  [our] 
Founding  Fathers...  understood  that  the  primary 
bulwark of a free society is a free press (43).
$ One can argue that all environments are hostile, and that death and 
extinction are probable events, while survival is improbable....  In my 
opinion, this problem may well be used as the framework on which to 
build the teaching of [science] (41 ; cf 42).
The internet represents a technological advance of equal 
wonder.  It has spawned revolutions of equal significance. 
Indeed, this world-wide-web has linked and liberated true 
problem-solvers (44), thereby helping to deliver (i.e., 20-24 ; 
34-35) this revolutionary theory of value to you:  V=f´(IR).
£
§3.  A NOTE ON METHOD
Fellow sailor George Smith was recently commended for his 
3-page PhD thesis (46); this compliment intrigued me.  
     But profound truths (2) uttered by another sailor (and 
fighter pilot) intrigued me even more; in fact, they inspired 
me to chart a course for Halifax, because the non-existence 
of scientific method (2 ; 10 ; 13 ; 30 ; 32 ; 36-38 ; 44-48) is 
yet another nontrivial affair; although we did indeed discuss 
this difficult and illusive truth at great length (1) , I'll merely 
relate one inspirational remark:
It's  always  a  bad  sign  when  people  come  into 
meetings  with  stacks  under  their  arms  and  start 
handing you piles to read.  I hired Smith because he 
was able to communicate something very complex 
and very important in just three pages (1).
Since economics was created to promote national interests 
(49), it comes of no surprise that most real problems (2 ; 4-7 
; 11 ; 16 ; 20-24 ; 28 ; 30 ; 32-38 ; 41-42 ; 44-48 ; 50-52) 
remain outside the non-existent subject of economics (47), 
and thus “economics” remains unable to analyze and inform 
strategy regarding mission-critical global threats.  And that's 
exactly why we're not really playing games here, afterall.†
£ Internet  publishing  reduces  the  stifling  impact  of  the  refereeing 
process on the papers accepted and submitted to journals.  ...Scholars 
are  less  bound  to  devote  a  large  part  of  their  time and  effort  on 
formalisms.  They have more leeway to concentrate  on matters  of 
content....   The dominance of orthodoxy is reduced (45).
† What Mises taught us in his writings, ...lectures, [and] seminars, was 
that economics... is primordially, crucially important.  Economics is 
not  an intellectual  game.  Economics  is  deadly  serious.  The very 
future of mankind... depends... upon widespread understanding of... 
the principles of economics.
    This is a lesson which is located almost entirely outside economics 
proper.  But all  Mises’ work depended ultimately upon this  tenet. 
Almost invariably, a scientist is motivated by values not strictly part of 
the science itself.  The lust for fame, for material rewards—even the 
pure love of truth—these goals may possibly be fulfilled by scientific 
success, but  are  themselves  not... worthwhile  goals.  What  drove 
Mises, what  accounted  for  his  passionate  dedication, his  ability  to 
calmly ignore the sneers of, and the isolation imposed by academic 
contemporaries,  was  his  conviction  that  the  survival  of  mankind 
depends on the development and dissemination of... economics….
     Economics is not simply a matter of intellectual problem solving, 
like a challenging crossword puzzle, but literally a matter of the life 
or death of the human race (50).
2
99.99% of all species that have inhabited the Earth 
are  extinct; the  average  species  lifespan  is  2  Myr. 
How  do  we  communicate  the  implications  which 
follow from these truths?  How many will grasp that 
sound  global  threat  mitigation  strategies  require 
unprecedented,  largely  redirected  international 
cooperation?   'Studies  of  mass  extinctions  tend  to 
emphasize the sheer scope of the carnage.  But the 
subtle differences between the species that died and 
those that survived can be crucial' [51] (24).$
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